The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science - current issue

Towards a General Theory of Antirepresentationalism

Garzon, F. C. — 2008-08-23

This work represents an attempt to stake out the landscape for dynamicism based on a radical dismissal of the information-processing paradigm that dominates the philosophy of cognitive science. In Section 2, after setting up the basic toolkit of a theory of minimal representationalism, I introduce the central tenets of dynamic systems theory (DST) by discussing recent research in the dynamics of embodiment (Thelen et al. [2001]) in the perseverative-reaching literature. A recent proposal on the dynamics of representation—the dynamic field approach (Spencer and Schöner [2003])—according to which the alleged representational gap between DST and representational theories of cognition needs to be bridged in order to explain higher-order cognitive activity will then be reviewed. In Section 3, I shall argue that Spencer and Schöner's attempt to bridge the representational gap may jeopardize the whole (antirepresentationalist) spirit of the DST project. In order to show why, I shall introduce the key concepts of ‘reliability of environment’ and ‘primagenesis’, and argue that DST can account for de-coupled, offline cognitive activity with no need of positing representational resources. Conclusions and directions for future research will follow.

Introduction

1.1 Minimal representationalism

The dynamic field approach

2.1 Dynamic systems theory and the continuity hypothesis

2.2 The dynamic field approach: Bridging the representational gap?

Towards a general theory of antirepresentationalism

3.1 Diagonal systems and microstimulated dissociations

3.2 Reliability of environment and primagenesis

3.3 Towards a general theory of antirepresentationalism

Conclusion

Branching and Uncertainty

Saunders, S., Wallace, D. — 2008-08-23

Following Lewis, it is widely held that branching worlds differ in important ways from diverging worlds. There is, however, a simple and natural semantics under which ordinary sentences uttered in branching worlds have much the same truth values as they conventionally have in diverging worlds. Under this semantics, whether branching or diverging, speakers cannot say in advance which branch or world is theirs. They are uncertain as to the outcome. This same semantics ensures the truth of utterances typically made about quantum mechanical contingencies, including statements of uncertainty, if the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics is true. The ‘incoherence problem’ of the Everett interpretation, that it can give no meaning to the notion of uncertainty, is thereby solved.

Introduction

Metaphysics

2.1 Personal fission

2.2 Branching worlds

Physics

Objections

Saunders and Wallace on Everett and Lewis

Tappenden, P. — 2008-08-23

Simon Saunders and David Wallace attempt to use a modified form of David Lewis's analysis of personal fission to ground the claim that prior to undergoing Everett branching an informed subject can be uncertain about which outcome s/he will observe. I argue that a central assumption of this seductive idea is questionable despite appearing innocuous and that at the very least further argument is needed in support of it.

Saunders and Wallace Reply

Saunders, S., Wallace, D. — 2008-08-23

Fisher's Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection--A Philosophical Analysis

Okasha, S. — 2008-08-23

This paper provides a philosophical analysis of the ongoing controversy surrounding R.A. Fisher's famous ‘fundamental theorem’ of natural selection. The difference between the ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ interpretations of the theorem is explained. I argue that proponents of the modern interpretation have captured Fisher's intended meaning correctly and shown that the theorem is mathematically correct, pace the traditional consensus. However, whether the theorem has any real biological significance remains an unresolved issue. I argue that the answer depends on whether we accept Fisher's non-standard notion of environmental change, on which the theorem rests; arguments for and against this notion are explored. I suggest that there is a close link between Fisher's fundamental theorem and the modern ‘gene's eye’ view of evolution.

Introduction

What Does the Fundamental Theorem Say?

Key Concepts Explained

Alleged Significance of the FTNS

Traditional versus Modern Interpretations of the FTNS

The Modern Interpretation Illustrated

Fisher's Concept of ‘Environmental Change’

Causality and the Modern Interpretation

The Significance of the FTNS Re-considered

Appendix

On the Common Structure of Bohmian Mechanics and the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber Theory: Dedicated to GianCarlo Ghirardi on the occasion of his 70th birthday

Allori, V., Goldstein, S., Tumulka, R., Zanghi, N. — 2008-08-23

Bohmian mechanics and the Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber theory provide opposite resolutions of the quantum measurement problem: the former postulates additional variables (the particle positions) besides the wave function, whereas the latter implements spontaneous collapses of the wave function by a nonlinear and stochastic modification of Schrödinger's equation. Still, both theories, when understood appropriately, share the following structure: They are ultimately not about wave functions but about ‘matter’ moving in space, represented by either particle trajectories, fields on space-time, or a discrete set of space-time points. The role of the wave function then is to govern the motion of the matter.

Introduction

Bohmian Mechanics

Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber

3.1 GRWm

3.2 GRWf

3.3 Empirical equivalence between GRWm and GRWf

Primitive Ontology

4.1 Primitive ontology and physical equivalence

4.2 Primitive ontology and symmetry

4.3 Without primitive ontology

4.4 Primitive ontology and quantum state

Differences between BM and GRW

5.1 Primitive ontology and quadratic functionals

5.2 Primitive ontology and equivariance

A Plethora of Theories

6.1 Particles, fields, and flashes

6.2 Schrödinger wave functions and many-worlds

The Flexible Wave Function

7.1 GRWf without collapse

7.2 Bohmian mechanics with collapse

7.3 Empirical equivalence and equivariance

What is a Quantum Theory without Observers?

Why the Parts of Absolute Space are Immobile

Huggett, N. — 2008-08-23

Newton's arguments for the immobility of the parts of absolute space have been claimed to licence several proposals concerning his metaphysics. This paper clarifies Newton, first distinguishing two distinct arguments. Then, it demonstrates, contrary to Nerlich ([2005]), that Newton does not appeal to the identity of indiscernibles, but rather to a view about de re representation. Additionally, DiSalle ([1994]) claims that one argument shows Newton to be an anti-substantivalist. I agree that its premises imply a denial of a kind of substantivalism, but I show that they are inconsistent with Newton's core doctrine that not all motion is the relative motions of bodies, and so conclude that they are not part of his considered views on space.

The Arguments

The Identity Argument

2.1 Identity of indiscernibles for individuals

2.2 Identity of indiscernibles for worlds and states

2.3 Representation de re

Kinematic Relationism

Conclusion

The End of Sleeping Beauty's Nightmare

Groisman, B. — 2008-08-23

The way a rational agent changes her belief in certain propositions/hypotheses in the light of new evidence lies at the heart of Bayesian inference. The basic natural assumption, as summarized in van Fraassen's Reflection Principle ([1984]), would be that in the absence of new evidence the belief should not change. Yet, there are examples that are claimed to violate this assumption. The apparent paradox presented by such examples, if not settled, would demonstrate the inconsistency and/or incompleteness of the Bayesian approach, and without eliminating this inconsistency, the approach cannot be regarded as scientific. The Sleeping Beauty Problem is just such an example. The existing attempts to solve the problem fall into three categories. The first two share the view that new evidence is absent, but differ about the conclusion of whether Sleeping Beauty should change her belief or not, and why. The third category is characterized by the view that, after all, new evidence (although hidden from the initial view) is involved. My solution is radically different and does not fall into either of these categories. I deflate the paradox by arguing that the two different degrees of belief presented in the Sleeping Beauty Problem are in fact beliefs in two different propositions, i.e., there is no need to explain the (un)change of belief.

The Sleeping Beauty Problem

The Problem Deflated

2.1 From contradiction to consistency

2.2 The inanimate version

2.3 Back to SB

Summary

Inertia and Determinism

Zimba, J. — 2008-08-23

Suppose all of the particles in the universe should happen to come to rest at the same time, in positions so arranged that all of the forces on every particle balance to zero at that time. What would happen next? Or rather, what does Newtonian mechanics say will happen next?

Preface

Inertia and Stasis

2.1 Stating the Law of Inertia more precisely

2.2 The stasis scenario

Indeterministic Examples

3.1 Abstract example

3.2 Second example

Non-Lipschitz Forces and Determinism

Beyond the Stasis Scenario

On the Predilections for Predictions

Harker, D. — 2008-08-23

Scientific theories are developed in response to a certain set of phenomena and subsequently evaluated, at least partially, in terms of the quality of fit between those same theories and appropriately distinctive phenomena. To differentiate between these two stages it is popular to describe the former as involving the accommodation of data and the latter as involving the prediction of data. Predictivism is the view that, ceteris paribus, correctly predicting data confers greater confirmation than successfully accommodating data. In this paper, I take issue with a variety of predictivist theses, argue that their role for issues of confirmation is extremely limited, and attempt to account for the appeal that predictivism has enjoyed.

Introduction

Temporal Predictivism

Heuristic Predictivism

Weak Predictivism

4.1 Inference to better theories

4.2 Inference to better methods

Arguments for Strong Heuristic Predictivism

5.1 Best explanations argument

5.2 Conditional support

5.3 Unique explanations

Increased Explanatory Unification

6.1 Explaining what other theories can't

6.2 Contrived hypotheses

6.2 Strength and simplicity

Conclusions

Reconsidering Cultural Selection Theory

Crozier, G. K. D. — 2008-08-23

This paper examines conceptual issues that arise in applications of Darwinian natural selection to cultural systems. I argue that many criticisms of cultural selectionist models have been based on an over-detailed reading of the analogy between biological and cultural units of selection. I identify five of the most powerful objections to cultural selection theory and argue that none cuts to its heart. Some objections are based on mistaken assumptions about the simplicity of the mechanisms of biological heredity. Other objections are attributable, rather, to mistaken inferences from observations of biological subject matter to what is essential in natural selection. I argue that such features are idiosyncratic of biological systems, but not essential for natural selection. My arguments throughout are illustrated by examples from biological and cultural evolution, and counter-factual illustrations from the history of theoretical biology.

Introduction

Cultural Selection Theory

First Objection: Lamarckianism

Second Objection: Genotype–Phenotype Distinction

Third Objection: Common Hereditary Architecture

Fourth Objection: Biological Analogue for Cultural Units

6.1 Regarding strict analogues

6.2 Regarding the trait analogue

6.3 Regarding the virus analogue

Fifth Objection: Environmental Interaction

Conclusion

Explanatory Inquiry and the Need for Explanation

Grimm, S. R. — 2008-08-23

Explanatory inquiry characteristically begins with a certain puzzlement about the world. But why do certain situations elicit our puzzlement (or curiosity) while others leave us, in some epistemically relevant sense, cold? Moreover, what exactly is involved in the move from a state of puzzlement to a state where one's puzzlement is satisfied? In this paper I try to answer both of these questions. I also suggest ways in which our account of scientific rationality might benefit from having a better sense of the kind of epistemic goal we are trying to realize, when we engage in our explanatory inquiries.

Two Senses

The Need for Explanation

An Example

Proto-understanding

Conclusion

Discerning Fermions

Muller, F. A., Saunders, S. — 2008-08-23

We demonstrate that the quantum-mechanical description of composite physical systems of an arbitrary number of similar fermions in all their admissible states, mixed or pure, for all finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces, is not in conflict with Leibniz's Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII). We discern the fermions by means of physically meaningful, permutation-invariant categorical relations, i.e. relations independent of the quantum-mechanical probabilities. If, indeed, probabilistic relations are permitted as well, we argue that similar bosons can also be discerned in all their admissible states; but their categorical discernibility turns out to be a state-dependent matter. In all demonstrated cases of discernibility, the fermions and the bosons are discerned (i) with only minimal assumptions on the interpretation of quantum mechanics; (ii) without appealing to metaphysical notions, such as Scotusian haecceitas, Lockean substrata, Postian transcendental individuality or Adamsian primitive thisness; and (iii) without revising the general framework of classical elementary predicate logic and standard set theory, thus without revising standard mathematics. This confutes: (a) the currently dominant view that, provided (i) and (ii), the quantum-mechanical description of such composite physical systems always conflicts with PII; and (b) that if PII can be saved at all, the only way to do it is by adopting one or other of the thick metaphysical notions mentioned above. Among the most general and influential arguments for the currently dominant view are those due to Schrödinger, Margenau, Cortes, Dalla Chiara, Di Francia, Redhead, French, Teller, Butterfield, Giuntini, Mittelstaedt, Castellani, Krause and Huggett. We review them succinctly and critically as well as related arguments by van Fraassen and Massimi.

Introduction: The Currently Dominant View

1.1 Weyl on Leibniz's principle

1.2 Intermezzo: Terminology and Leibnizian principles

1.3 The rise of the currently dominant view

1.4 Overview

Elements of Quantum Mechanics

2.1 Physical states and physical magnitudes

2.2 Composite physical systems of similar particles

2.3 Fermions and bosons

2.4 Physical properties

2.5 Varieties of quantum mechanics

Analysis of Arguments

3.1 Analysis of the Standard Argument

3.2 Van Fraassen's analysis

3.3 Massimi's analysis

The Logic of Identity and Discernibility

4.1 The language of quantum mechanics

4.2 Identity of physical systems

4.3 Indiscernibility of physical systems

4.4 Some kinds of discernibility

Discerning Elementary Particles

5.1 Preamble

5.2 Fermions

5.3 Bosons

Concluding Discussion

Evidence and Leverage: Comment on Roush

Barnes, E. C. — 2008-08-23

Sherrilyn Roush's Tracking Truth provides a sustained and ambitious development of the basic idea that knowledge is true belief that tracks the truth. In this essay, I provide a quick synopsis of Roush's book and offer a substantive discussion of her analysis of scientific evidence. Roush argues that, for e to serve as evidence for h, it should be easier to determine the truth value of e than it is to determine the truth value of h, an ideal she refers to as ‘leverage’. She defends a detailed method by which the value of p(h/e) is computed without ‘direct’ information about p(h) but only using evidence about the value of p(e), from which the value of p(h) is derived. She presents an example of how to use her leverage method, which I argue involves a certain critical mistake. I show how the leveraging method can be used in a way that is sound—I conclude with a few remarks about the importance of distinguishing clearly between prior and posterior probabilities.

Jesse Prinz Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion

Griffiths, P. E. — 2008-08-23

Don Ross Economic Theory and Cognitive Science: Microexplanation

Dowding, K. — 2008-08-23

Phil Dowe Galileo, Darwin, and Hawking: The Interplay of Science, Reason, and Religion

Scott, M. — 2008-08-23